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ing with) reform. Law professors who do that work must be sensi-
tive to, perhaps even greatly assist with, the work of other 
academics, but should not forget the real limitations of their train-
ing and understanding. As Mark Tushnet once wrote, we are sub-
ject to the "lawyer as astrophysicist" myth, that any lawyer can 
read a physics book over the weekend and send a rocket to the 
moon on Monday. 
State constitutional law was roundly ignored until, beginning 
in the late 1970s, liberal law professors retreated in despair to state 
supreme courts, hoping to find them more receptive to activism 
than the Burger Court had become. Today state constitutional law 
has become the haven for arguments rejected in the federal courts. 
Why not invert the analysis-why not see whether federal constitu-
tional law might profitably borrow from arguments accepted by 
state courts in interpreting state constitutions? For example, the 
Supreme Court has fallen into a morass attempting to decide issues 
associated with the separation of powers (for example, the nondele-
gation doctrine and the legislative veto). In doing so, the Court 
gave no hint of being aware that some state supreme courts have 
had interesting things to say on such subjects under their own con-
stitutions. It might seem demeaning for constitutional scholars to 
dirty their hands with state cases, but ultimately it might be more 
valuable than many of the other things we routinely do. 
CARL A. AUERBACH34 
My dissatisfaction with the constitutional scholarship of law 
professors is long-standing. That scholarship is devoted primarily 
to the analysis of Supreme Court opinions, yet generally neglects 
the critical examination of their legislative fact assumptions and so-
cial consequences. In this Bicentennial year, I know of no work by 
a law professor evaluating the structural foundation which the Con-
stitution erected for a democratic republic. 
When the Constitution was adopted, we were an underdevel-
oped nation with a small homogeneous population living mostly on 
farms. Little, if anything, has been written on whether the Consti-
tution's structure of federalism and the separation of powers contin-
ues to suit a large, pluralistic nation that spans a continent and 
possesses the most developed economy functioning in an interde-
pendent world-a nation that has assumed global responsibilities. 
Yet there has been a spate of writing on whether Garcia v. San 
34. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
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Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority should have overruled Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery. 
Despite general talk of a "new federalism," we have heard little 
from law professors about how, and within what legal framework, 
powers, resources and activities should be divided among federal, 
state, and local authorities so as best to serve the diverse needs of 
our people. 
I also think that constitutional scholarship commands a dis-
proportionate share of scarce, intellectual resources in the law 
schools. After all, the Supreme Court is not the most important 
maker of public policy. The legislatures that created the welfare 
state and protected civil rights have done more to promote equality 
than even the Supreme Court. Too little attention, relatively speak-
ing, is being paid to their work or the political processes that ac-
count for it. For example, there is much more writing urging the 
Supreme Court to read an economic bill of rights (not President 
Reagan's version) into the Constitution than about the legislation 
and administrative structure that would be needed practically to 
guarantee to all people jobs, health care, education, and the other 
necessities that the advocates of an economic bill of rights have in 
mind. It is a shame, too, that the debate about the social functions 
of private law has been left almost entirely to the adherents of Law 
and Economics and Critical Legal Studies. 
KIRK EMMERT35 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to foresee the issues, political 
configuration, and constitutional direction which will dominate the 
Supreme Court in the next decade or more. But there is little doubt 
that one of the most important questions underlying the activities of 
the Court, and scholarship about it, will be its role in our constitu-
tional liberal democracy. In recent years this question has been ex-
plored in greater depth than at any other time in our history, with 
the exception perhaps of the New Deal, the Civil War, or the 
Founding. Among the more immediate causes of this are the nomi-
nation or appointment of controversial Justices, interest in our insti-
tutions kindled by the Bicentennial, increased scholarly concern 
during the last two decades, particularly among political scientists 
and historians, with American political thought and institutions, 
and widespread public and scholarly questioning of the dominant, 
liberal consensus regarding the rule of the Court and the nature of 
constitutional jurisprudence. But whatever the immediate causes 
35. Professor of Political Science, Kenyon College. 
